Beware UN Food Systems Summit Trojan Horse

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

KUALA LUMPUR: Undoubtedly, the world needs to reform existing food systems to better serve humanity and sustainable development. But the United Nations World Food Systems Summit(UNFSS) must be consistent with UN-led multilateralism.

For the first time ever, the World Economic Forum (WEF), a partnership of some of the world’s most powerful corporations, is partnering the UN in launching the Summit, now scheduled for September, with its ‘Pre-Summit’ beginning today.

Food insecurity is primarily due to inequalities and deprivations as victims lack the means to obtain the food they need. The UN should not serve those who cynically use hunger, starvation and deprivation to advance private commercial interests.

UN-led multilateralism threatened

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and seemingly unchallenged US dominance in the 1990s posed new threats to UN-led multilateralism. The World Trade Organization was set up in 1995 outside the UN system. Later, ‘recalcitrant’ Secretary-General (SG) Boutros-Ghali was blocked from a second term.

The four UN Development Decades from the 1960s ended with the lofty, Secretariat-drafted Millennium Declaration, bypassing Member State involvement. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were then elaborated by the UN Development Programme with scant Member State consultation.

Growing corporate sway in the UN system got a big boost with the UN Global Compact. Such influences have affected governance of UN agencies, now better known as the World Health Organization struggles to contain the pandemic.

Difficult negotiations followed growing developing country disappointment with the MDGs, not delivering on climate finance as promised in 2009, and failure to better address the 2008 global financial crisis and its aftermath.

Hence, the negotiated Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) compromise enjoys greater legitimacy than the MDGs. However, achieving Agenda 2030 was undermined from the outset as rich countries blocked needed funding at the third UN Financing for Development summit in mid-2015.

Summit bypasses UN processes

In the last dozen years after the 2008 world food price spike, the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) has become an inclusive forum for civil society and corporate interests to debate how best to advance food security. Unsurprisingly, CFS has long addressed food systems.

CFS’s High-Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) is widely acknowledged as competent, having prepared balanced and comprehensive reports on matters of current and likely future concern. In the UN system, CFS is now seen as a ‘multistakeholder’ engagement model for emulation. Yet, the Summit bypassed CFS from the outset.

Nominally answering to the UNSG, Summit processes have been largely set by a small, largely unaccountable coterie. UNFSS organisers initially moved ahead without representative stakeholder participation until his intervention led to some consultative processes.

Mainly funded by the WEF and some major partners, they remain mindful of who pays the piper. Hence, they mainly promote supposedly ‘game-changing’, ‘scalable’ and investment-inducing solutions claiming to offer technological fixes.

Agroecology innovation

An HLPE report has approvingly considered agroecology or ‘nature-based solutions’. Many scientists have been working with food producers for decades to increase food productivity, output, diversity and resilience through better agroecological practices, thus cutting costs and enhancing sustainability.

The evidence is unambiguous that agroecology has delivered far better results than ‘Green Revolution’ innovations. A survey of almost 300 large ecological agriculture projects in more than fifty poor countries reported rising farmer incomes due to lower costs and a 79% average productivity increase.

This contrasts with the record of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) launched in 2006. With funding from the Gates and Rockefeller Foundations, it promised to double yields and incomes for 30 million smallholder farm households by 2020. Despite much government spending, yields hardly rose as rural poverty grew.

Agroecological innovations have proved effective against infestations. Thus, safer, more effective biopesticides that do not kill useful insects and microbes, and non-toxic alternatives to agrochemical pesticides have been created.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) hosted its first International Agroecology Symposium in 2014, before committing to ‘Scaling Up Agroecology’. But for Kip Tom, President Trump’s representative, FAO was no longer “science-based”.

Demonising agroecology

The Gates Foundation has been funding the Cornell Alliance for Science, ostensibly to “depolarize the GMO debates” by providing training in “advanced agricultural biotechnology communications”. Why traditional agricultural practices can’t transform African agriculture is only one instance of such sponsored propaganda masquerading as science.

Well-resourced lobbyists are using the UNFSS to secure support and legitimacy for commercial agendas. With abundant means, their advocacy routinely invokes ‘public-private partnerships’ and ‘science, technology and innovation’ rhetoric.

Forced to be more inclusive, Summit organisers are now using ‘solution clusters’ for advocacy. They then build broad ‘multi-stakeholder’ coalitions to advance purported solutions with the UNFSS mark of approval.

With strong and growing evidence of agroecology’s progress and potential, propaganda against it has grown in recent years. Agroecology advocates are caricatured as ‘Luddite eco-imperialists’, ‘Keeping Africa on the Brink of Starvation’, and condemning farmers to ‘poverty, malnutrition and death’.

A public relations consultant has accused agroecology advocates of being “the face of a ‘green’ neocolonialism” “idealizing peasant labour and retrograde subsistence farming” and denying “the Green Revolution’s successes”.

Agroecology solutions are the main, if not only ones consistent with the UN’s overarching commitment to sustainable development. But the propagandists portray them as uninformed barriers to agricultural and social progress. Such deliberate deceptions block needed food system reforms.

UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Michael Fakhri alerted UNFSS Special Envoy Agnes Kalibata that agroecology is being dismissed as backward when it should be central to the Summit. Concurrently President of AGRA, with its particular commitment to needed food system reform, she is in an impossible position.

Best Summit money can buy?

Investing in the Summit is securing legitimacy and more resources from governments, the UN system, private philanthropy and others to further their commercial agendas. Meanwhile, many are working in good faith to make the most of the UN Summit.

Nevertheless, it is setting a dangerous precedent for the UN system. It has rashly opened a back door, allowing corporate-led ‘multi-stakeholderism’ to undermine well-tested, inclusive ‘multi-stakeholder’ arrangements developed over decades under multilateral Member State oversight.

UNFSS Science Days on 8 and 9 July indicated the Summit is being used to push for a new food science panel. This will undercut the HLPE, and ultimately, the CFS. Hence, the UNFSS seems like a Trojan Horse to advance particular corporate interests, inadvertently undermining what UN-led multilateralism has come to mean.

As both CFS and HLPE are successful UN institutions, the Summit will inevitably undermine its own achievements. Hence, for many Member States and civil society, UNFSS represents a step backward, rather than forward.

Related IPS Articles

· Struggle for the Future of Food

· Another False Start in Africa Sold with Green Revolution Myths

· Green Counter-Revolution in Africa?

· Agricultural Trade Liberalization Undermined Food Security

· Big Business Capturing UN SDG Agenda?

· Genetically Engineered Disappointments

Finance Covid-19 Relief and Recovery, Not Debt Buybacks

Anis Chowdhury and Jomo Kwame Sundaram

SYDNEY and KUALA LUMPUR: In July, the UN Secretary-General warned that a “series of countries in insolvency might trigger a global depression”. Earlier, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had called for a US$2.5 trillion coronavirus crisis package for developing countries.

Debt distraction

In the face of the world’s worst economic contraction since the Great Depression, a sense of urgency has now spread to most national capitals and the Washington-based Bretton Woods institutions. Unless urgently addressed, the massive economic contractions due to the COVID-19 pandemic and policy responses to contain contagion threaten to become depressions.

Nevertheless, many long preoccupied with developing countries’ debt burdens and excessive debt insist on using scarce fiscal resources, including donor assistance, to reduce government debt, instead of strengthening fiscal measures for adequate and appropriate relief and recovery measures.

Most debt restructuring measures do not address countries’ currently more urgent need to finance adequate and appropriate relief and recovery packages. In the new circumstances, the debt preoccupation, perhaps appropriate previously, has become a problematic distraction, diminishing the ‘fiscal space’ for addressing contagion and its consequences.

Buybacks no solution

One problematic debt distraction is the renewed call for debt buybacks from private creditors, through an IMF-managed Brady Plan-like multilateral bond buyback facility funded by a global consortium of countries. The historical evidence is clear that bond buybacks are no panacea and neither an equitable nor efficient way to reduce sovereign debt.

The contemporary situation is quite different from the one three decades ago when US Treasury Secretary Brady’s plan successfully cut losses for the US commercial banks responsible for most debt to Latin American and other developing country governments. Hence, prospects for a comprehensive arrangement involving all creditors are far more remote now. Unsurprisingly, debt buybacks have been rare since the mid-1990s.

Furthermore, private bond markets have changed significantly from what they were during the Brady era when there was last a comparable effort involving many debtor countries. Importantly, the new creditors largely consist of pension and mutual funds, insurance companies, investment firms and sophisticated individual investors. Also, today’s creditors have less incentive to participate in sovereign debt restructurings.

Many of today’s creditors are now represented by powerful lobbies, most significantly, the International Institute of Finance (IIF). Unlike before, when their efforts focused on OECD developed economies, the IIF now actively works directly with developing country finance ministers and central bank governors.

Voluntary scheme problematic

But the debt buyback proposal, to be underwritten by a multilateral donor consortium, can inadvertently encourage hard bargaining by powerful creditors who know that money is available, while retaining the option of threatening litigation. Hence, resulting buybacks are likely to cost more. The evidence shows that a country’s secondary market debt price is higher when it has a buyback programme than otherwise.

Such an approach can also encourage trading in risky sovereign bonds promising higher returns, inadvertently sowing the seeds for another debt crisis. Private investment funds are more likely to buy such bonds if there is a higher likelihood of selling them off, while still making money from the high interest rates, even when the bonds are sold at large discounts.

The proposal’s voluntary feature also creates incentives for creditors to ‘free-ride’ by ‘holding-out’, thus undermining the likelihood of success. If the scheme is expected to effectively restore creditworthiness, then each existing creditor would hold on to the original claims, expecting market value to rise as new creditors provide relief.

Maintaining a good credit rating undoubtedly enables access to international funds at relatively lower interest rates. But low-income countries typically have poor access to international capital markets, and only get access by paying high risk premia, due to poor credit ratings.

Compared to near zero interest rates in major OECD economies, African governments pay 5~16% on 10-year bonds, while Kenya, Zambia and others pay more. Borrowing costs for developing countries issuing Eurobonds more than doubled due to high interest rates.

Also, many, if not most contemporary creditors are not primarily involved in lending money. They are therefore unlikely to respond to government requests for new loans needed to grow out of a debt crisis.

New obstacles include the greater variety of powerful creditors, the unintended incentives for free-riding inherent in voluntary debt reduction, problematic precedents as well as perverse incentives for both governments and bondholders. Perhaps most importantly, debt reduction by purely ‘voluntary’ means -- like buybacks, exit bonds, and debt-equity swaps – is unlikely to be adequate to the enormity of the problem.

Successful buybacks?

Only banks definitely gained from the Brady deals. Benefits were unclear for most debtors other than Mexico and Argentina, and particularly ineffective for Uruguay and the Philippines, where gains were paltry, if not negative.

Positive effects for economic growth were very small, as most buybacks failed to improve either market confidence in or the creditworthiness of debtor countries. Hence, even if private creditors participate, there is no guarantee that debtor countries will benefit significantly at the end of the long and complicated processes envisaged.

The 2012 Greek bond buybacks, backed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF ‘troika’, effectively bailed out the mostly French and German banks owed money by Greece. Celebrated as a success, it neither restored Greece’s growth nor reduced its debt burden.

While bond buybacks can always be a debt restructuring option for consideration, Ecuador’s in 2008-2009 are probably the only one regarded as favourable to the debtor country. Wall Street observers suggest that Argentina’s recent initiative may also have a positive outcome.

Also, after successfully restructuring its commercial debt, the country is now better able to negotiate with its official creditors, particularly the IMF. These ‘successes’ have been exceptional, led by the countries themselves and ultimately settled on their terms, taking advantage of opportunities presented by global crises for comprehensive national debt restructuring.

Importantly, neither creditor consortia nor multilateral financial institutions were involved in coordinating or underwriting both restructurings, and hence could not impose onerous policy conditionalities. Thus, when able to take advantage of favourable conditions for negotiating strategic buybacks, debtor countries may be better able to benefit from them.

Urgent financing needed

Despite her earlier reputation as a ‘debt hawk’, new World Bank Chief Economist Carmen Reinhart recognizes the gravity of the situation and recently advised countries to borrow more: “First fight the war, then figure out how to pay for it.” Hence, in these COVID-19 times, donor money would be better utilized to finance relief and recovery, rather than debt buybacks.

Multilateral development finance institutions should resume their traditional role of mobilizing funds at minimal cost to finance development, or currently, relief and recovery, by efficiently intermediating on behalf of developing countries. They can borrow at the best available market rates to lend to developing countries which, otherwise, would have to borrow on their own at more onerous rates.

Multilateral Bank Intermediation Must Help Developing Countries' Recovery

Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Anis Chowdhury

SYDNEY and KUALA LUMPUR, Aug 07 (IPS)  - International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva has warned that developing countries would need more than the earlier estimated US$2.5 trillion to provide relief to affected families and businesses and expedite economic recovery.

With their limited fiscal capacities, developing countries will need to borrow more, increasing their often already high public debt burdens. Developing country debt has grown rapidly since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (GFC), reaching historical highs even before the pandemic.

A deep pandemic induced depression may also require governments to take over huge private debt liabilities. All this has increased calls for urgent debt relief, cancellation and restructuring, and for new IMF and World Bank lending lines, including new IMF special drawing rights (SDRs).

Not enough debt relief

On 13 April, the IMF approved debt service relief for 25 eligible low-income countries (LICs), estimated at US$213.5 million, for six months, i.e., from 14 April until mid-October 2020.

On 15 April, G20 leaders announced their ‘Debt Service Suspension Initiative for Poorest Countries’ from May to the end of 2020 for 73 primarily LICs. The G20 initiative would cover around US$20 billion of bilateral public debt owed to official creditors by International Development Association (IDA) and least developed countries (LDCs).

Such steps are welcome, providing some temporary relief, but far short of the eligible countries’ long-term public and publicly guaranteed external debt of US$457 billion in 2018.

UNCTAD estimates that in 2020 and 2021, middle- and low-income countries face debt service repayments between US$700 billion and US$1.1 trillion, while upper middle-income developing countries expect to pay US$2.0~2.3 trillion.

The G20 initiative is already seen as merely kicking the can down the road. It does not cancel any debt, which is to be repaid in full over 2022–2024, as interest continues to grow. Hence, it is quite unlike the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).

Furthermore, money saved from debt relief “can be used to pay the private creditors on time and in full”, i.e., prioritizing private over public creditors. The G20 initiative only applies to a limited number of countries, and does not impact the US$8 billion owed to private lenders and the US$12 billion debt to multilateral creditors.

An Oxfam report estimated that eligible countries are still required to pay at least US$33.7 billion for debt servicing this year, or US$2.8 billion monthly, “double the amount Uganda, Malawi, and Zambia combined spent on their annual health budget”.

Furthermore, the initiatives presume that Covid-19 shocks to developing economies will be short and swift, and that developing countries can make debt repayments over the next 3-4 years.

IMF and World Bank falling short

The World Bank has put in place a US$14 billion fast-track package to meet immediate health and economic needs, envisaging financial support of around US$160 billion during 2020-2021.

The IMF has doubled access to its Rapid Credit Facility and Rapid Financing Instrument to meet greater expected demand for emergency financing of about US$100 billion, without requiring “a full-fledged program in place”. By mid-June, various IMF facilities had committed around US$300 billion.

Although these financing instruments involve fewer conditionalities and faster approval, eligibility still depends on familiar — and, in current conditions, very restrictive — criteria. These include, inter alia, having to satisfy the ‘revamped’ joint Bank-Fund debt sustainability framework, which critics deem “obsolete”.

Therefore, actual urgent liquidity support falls far short of the IMF’s US$1 trillion lending capacity while the attempt to issue new SDRs for Covid-19 has been blocked by the Trump administration.

Debt reduction wrong priority now

The UN warned of the dire consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic in April, and in May, argued that without bold policy action, the pandemic would set back the SDGs.

Facing the greatest economic crisis since the 1930s, many developing countries have little choice but to borrow to create fiscal space, rather than focus on complicated, time-consuming long-term debt restructuring, workouts or buybacks.

Instead of obsessing over debt, some developing countries are tapping global debt markets to meet Covid-19 financing needs. When governments can borrow on reasonable terms to invest in projects needed for sustainable development, debt may even be desirable, if not necessary, especially in resource-poor countries.

For some, in a low interest rate environment, it is reasonable for developing countries to borrow more, even raising their debt/GDP ratios to levels previously regarded as dangerous, to fund recovery. This time, it is really different as debt costs are lower and are expected to stay low for some time to come.

Furthermore, the consequences of fiscal inaction, so as to not take on debt, can be disastrous for the developing world, paradoxically making current stock of debt unsustainable. On the other hand, new borrowing to mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic on growth can make debt sustainable.

However, most non-investment grade developing countries have to pay substantially higher risk premiums, due to the prejudices and biases of market finance, even when their macroeconomic ‘fundamentals’ are sound.

Pandemic emergency financing fiasco

After the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa, the Bank launched the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) in July 2017, using insurance-like ‘catastrophe bonds’ and derivatives to raise private sector money for LICs’ pandemic responses.

The PEF promised to “blend the best of the public and private sectors, helping to keep 1.6 billion people safe” while “transferring [financial] risk [from governments] to international markets”.

To draw investors, the PEF has stringent and controversial rules on when and how much to pay-out. To make them attractive to investors, PEF bonds were designed to reduce the probability of paying out.

Due to its complicated approval process the PEF had not paid out a single dollar until the end of March, although the World Health Organization designated the Covid-19 outbreak a “public health emergency of international concern” on January 30, and a “pandemic” on 11 March. The pay-out decision was only made on 27 April; as of 27 July, only a paltry US$146.5 million had been “transferred to support” 48 countries — “too little, too late”, even for The Wall Street Journal.

Meanwhile, its “cash window” – funded by donors – has not been replenished after being used up for the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2018-2019.

In April 2019, Larry Summers, former World Bank chief economist and US Treasury Secretary, described the PEF as “an embarrassing mistake” and “financial goofiness”, noting that the programme was “loved” for promoting private sector involvement.

Intermediation role required

With preferred creditor status, the Fund and the Bank can borrow ‘cheaply’, i.e., at the much lower interest rates available to them. By intermediating, they can enable developing countries, especially LICs and LDCs, to borrow cheaply for their relief and recovery.

A first step would be to ditch the last Bank president’s now discredited ‘mobilizing finance for development’ (MFD) framework to use public funds, including official development assistance (ODA), to leverage private finance for public-private partnerships (PPPs).

As with the PEF, the MFD approach has failed to leverage billions in ODA into trillions of development finance, as promised, mobilizing only US$0.37 of additional private capital for LICs for every US$1 of public money invested.

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